The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, …nancially constrained …rms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those …nancial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades o¤ the bene…ts of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if …nancial markets are su¢ ciently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.
Introduction
The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small …rms. Evidence of these subcontracting arrangements in the developing world (see, e.g., the footwear industry in Taiwan (Levy (1990) ), Mexico (Woodru¤ (2002) ) and Brazil (Schmitz (1995) ) contrasts with the intuition that, in response to input market failures and poor contract enforcement, …rms should tend to be larger and more vertically integrated in those countries (see, e.g., Palepu (1997, 2000) ). 1 A second well-known characteristic of the industrial organization of developing countries is that underdeveloped …nancial markets are a serious constraint to investment for small and medium-sized …rms (see, e.g., Banerjee
and Du ‡o (2004) for a survey of the literature). 2 This paper argues that the relationship between (capital and input) market development and vertical integration is a complex one. In contrast to commonly held views, the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, the relationship between investor protection and vertical integration is, instead, likely to take an inverted U-shape.
To explore the connection between …nancial constraints and vertical integration, a …rst necessary step is to ask whether vertical integration makes it easier or harder to raise external …nance. Section 2 starts by introducing an incomplete contract model in which a seller can produce a good that can be used by a buyer or sold on a spot market. Which of those two trading con…gurations yields a higher surplus depends on market conditions, which are unknown at the time of initial contracting.
Neither the seller nor the buyer has cash, and both need to borrow from an external investor. Since owners can steal part of the pro…ts of their …rms, rents need to be provided in order to insure repayment of the loan. This implies that entrepreneurs can only pledge a fraction of the pro…ts of their project to external investors and therefore face borrowing constraints. In environments in which it is hard to borrow, the choice between vertical integration and non-integration is then 1 Acemoglu et al. (2006) show that this anecdotal observation is not explained by di¤erences in industrial composition: developing countries have relatively larger shares of …rms in industries that are relatively more vertically integrated in richer countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Macchiavello (2006) and Kim and Shin (2007) also provide evidence that systematic di¤erences in the degree of vertical integration across countries correlate with the degree of …nancial development. 2 The paper provides a framework to think about small and medium-sized enterprises, for which borrowing constraints are likely to be important. In focussing on borrowing constraints we do not deny that other characteristics of the business environment in developing countries have potentially large e¤ects on the incentives of …rms to vertically integrate (e.g., low skills in the labour force, labour regulation, other reasons pushing …rms into the informal sector).
taken to maximize the pledgeable income (i.e., the expected returns that can be promised to the investor) of the two projects.
Section 3 highlights the main mechanisms through which the choice between vertical integration and non-integration a¤ects pledgeable income. The main message is that, from a …nancial point of view, vertical integration trades o¤ the bene…ts of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque for the external investor. The positive "joint liability" e¤ect associated with vertical integration comes from the fact that, given …nal product market conditions, the pro…ts of two vertically related …rms depend, through bargaining, on input market conditions and are therefore negatively correlated. When the price of the input is high, so are the pro…ts of the upstream …rm. When, instead, the price of the intermediate input is low, it is the downstream …rm that bene…ts. Negatively correlated returns make joint liability relatively more attractive. Vertical integration, however, comes with a negative "demonitoring" e¤ect. Under vertical integration the …nancier of the …rm can seek repayment from a single entrepreneur but not from an employee, whilst under non-integration she can seek repayments from both the downstream and upstream owners. In other words, under non-integration the investor can claim repayments from two parties rather than one, as well as over earnings which represent a compensation for e¤ort.
The trade-o¤ implies that vertical integration is preferred when pledgeable income is higher. For instance, a high cash ‡ows at the end of the chain implies that the optimal …nancial structure chooses a relatively low level of debt, which guarantees repayment regardless of input market conditions. Under those circumstances, vertical integration achieves higher pledgeable income since it insulates the pro…ts of the …rm from input market conditions. When the value of production at the end of the chain is low, instead, the optimal contract sets a high debt, which is repaid only when input market conditions are favorable to the downstream …rm. While the pledgeable income of an integrated …rm is equal to that of a non-integrated downstream …rm, non-integration allows the investor to receive the pledgeable income of the upstream …rm as well and is therefore preferred. Section 4 presents two extensions to the baseline model and derives testable predictions linking the institutional environment to the vertical integration decision. The two extensions combine the baseline model implication that vertical integration is preferred when pledgeable incomes are higher with well known mechanisms associated with imperfect contracting and borrowing constraints.
The …rst extension introduces a distinction between the degree of "investor protection"(i.e., the extent to which entrepreneurs can steal pro…ts from external investors) and "contract enforcement", i.e., the extent to which buyers can avoid paying suppliers for the input provided. In particular, we assume that, in stealing the pro…ts of her …rm, the buyer can also default on a fraction of the (trade) credit extended by the supplier. As a consequence of this imperfection, to ensure loan repayment the …nancial contract must leave higher rents to the entrepreneur.
Imperfections in the enforcement of contracts between the seller and the buyer have an ambiguous e¤ect on vertical integration. On the one hand, since input transactions among independent …rms occur at higher prices, the rents necessary to ensure repayment are higher under non-integration than under vertical integration. This e¤ect captures the common argument that vertical integration is preferred in the presence of contractual imperfections with input suppliers.
On the other hand, by increasing the rents necessary to ensure loan repayment, imperfect contract enforcement with the input supplier reduces the income that can be pledged by the two …rms.
According to the logic of the baseline model, this favors non-integration.
The interplay of those two e¤ects implies that the relationship between vertical integration and the institutional environment is complex. In particular, contract enforcement and investor protection are complementary determinants of vertical integration, in the sense that non-integration is more prevalent when both are either relatively high or relatively low. The overall quality of the institutional environment, in terms of both investor protection and contract enforcement, therefore, has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the incentives for vertical integration.
The second extension to the baseline model introduces product market competition at the end of the value chain. The interplay between product market competition and the positive relationship between vertical integration and pledgeable income gives an additional mechanism through which the relationship between investor protection and vertical integration is non-monotonic. At very low levels of investor protection, it is not possible to …nance both the downstream and upstream units. The industry is then characterized by small, vertically disintegrated …rms that outsource their components in the market. As investor protection increases, two e¤ects kick in. On the one hand, as access to …nance gets easier, it becomes possible to expand the …rm and …nance the investments required to set up the upstream unit as well. This e¤ect pushes towards vertical integration. On the other hand, better investor protection fosters entry of …rms in the industry, increases competition, and eventually leads to lower equilibrium cash ‡ows at the end of the chain. This e¤ect, as emphasized above, pushes towards non-integration. The …rst e¤ect is stronger at relatively low levels of investor protection; while the second e¤ect is stronger at higher levels of investor protection.
Section 5 confronts the theoretical predictions with empirical evidence based the historical experience of the textile industry in the nineteenth century as well as contemporary cross-country studies. Section 6 discusses the implications of relaxing many of the assumptions alongside with other possible extensions to the model.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between …nancial development and the industrial organization of developing countries. Banerjee (2004) and Banerjee and Munshi (2004) present insightful evidence on the relationship between …nancial constraints and vertical integration in industries based within communities in India. The model in this paper provides an analytical treatment of the issues treated in those papers. Mookherjee (1999) also provides a discussion of the costs and bene…ts of vertical integration in less developed countries, but he focuses on the role of uncertainty in input supply. More recently, Kranton and Swamy (2006) have studied the microeconomics of exporting in a model that also features multiple hold-up problems between various actors along the supply chain (exporters, agents and producers). They discuss why vertical integration might not be feasible in institutionally poor environments, which complements the insights of this paper. Moreover, they provide an analysis of putting-out systems, a hybrid organizational form closely related to some of the discussion in this paper. Finally, this paper is related to the theoretical literature on micro…nance and joint liability contracts across …rms in developing countries (see, e.g., Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Ghatak and Kali (2001) ). An important di¤erence, however, is that in our context the joint liability of the two productive units is linked to an input transaction.
This work is also closely related to the literature on the theory of the …rm. While we do not intend to downplay the importance of non-contractible investments in determining the vertical integration decision (a view formalized in the property right approach (see, e.g., Hart (1995) ), this paper emphasizes how vertical integration a¤ects the ex-post (governance) relationship between the external investor and the entrepreneurs, and is therefore closer in spirit to the transaction costs approach to …rm boundaries (e.g., Williamson (1971) ). Property rights theories of the …rm with …nancially constrained entrepreneurs (see, e.g., Legros and Newman (2004) ) predict that the allocation of control rights is twisted in favour of the entrepreneur with more ex-ante bargaining power or wealth. The ex-ante distribution of wealth and bargaining power, however, might be context speci…c and di¢ cult to observe, making those theories hard to test. The approach in this paper emphasizes the …nancial properties of the organizational form and allows for predictions that do not depend on those details. Finally, In de…ning a …rm as a nexus of contracts characterized by a centralized allocation of control rights and joint liability, the paper borrows from the legal literature (e.g., Cheung (1983) , Hausmann and Kraakman (2001) ), as well as from the work of business historians (e.g., Lamoreaux (1998)). 3 
The Model

Set up
Consider two managers, a buyer and a seller, respectively in charge of two di¤erent projects: a downstream (d) plant and an upstream (u) plant. The two managers have no cash and borrow from an investor to …nance the investments required to start their respective plants. The upstream unit produces a good that can be used by the downstream unit or sold to an external market. The two managers are aware of the possibility that certain features of the input may make it best suited to be traded on the spot market, but they cannot foresee the nature of these features, and hence cannot write an ex-ante contract which is contingent on the nature of ex-post trade.
The production process generates …nal cash ‡ows V: The input can be purchased (respectively sold) on the spot market at price p (respectively p 0 ). There is ex-ante uncertainty over the prevailing input market conditions. To simplify, assume that with probability the input can be purchased at price p = p < V; otherwise p = p < p: For simplicity, let us assume that p 0 = p with < 1: The upstream manager can always produce an appropriate input at cost c; where p < c < p: A fraction of the costs is monetary and corresponds to a …nancial outlay (for example, it could correspond to the purchase of tools). The remaining fraction 1 ; however, is an e¤ort cost that cannot be transferred and is borne by the upstream manager, for example the opportunity cost of working to produce the intermediate input. Since p < c < p < V; when p = p; the upstream manager is not cost-e¤ective, and the input should be procured on the market. When p = p; however, the upstream manager is cost-e¤ective and it is strictly more pro…table for the input to be produced by the upstream manager and to be sold to the downstream manager. The parameters and therefore capture the speci…city of the relationship.
As is commonly assumed in the incomplete contracts literature, the realization of the state of nature is observable but not veri…able: it is observed by the two managers but not by third parties such as investors and courts. 4 
Ownership
Ownership determines residual control rights over the use of the input. We focus on two di¤erent
con…gurations. Under non-integration the two units are separately owned and managed …rms. In the absence of an enforceable contract, two independent …rms trade with each other if and only if the two owners agree on a suitable price P for the input. Under vertical integration the owner of the …rm, i.e., the downstream manager, bargains with her employee, i.e., the upstream manager, over wage w, but can impose by …at whether the two divisions of the integrated …rms should trade with each other or trade on the spot market. Both P and w are negotiated through an ex-post e¢ cient bargaining process in which the downstream manager has the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the upstream manager. 5 Control over …nancial streams is transferred with ownership. Only a fraction ' of the monetary pro…ts are veri…able, and therefore an owner can always guarantee a fraction (1 ') of the monetary pro…ts of the …rm for himself. 6 The parameter ' is a proxy for the degree of external investor protection in the economy. 7 In contrast to repayment to an investor lending capital, the model assumes that owners cannot 4 Prices cannot be veri…ed by courts because the exact features of the required input cannot be described. The court observes many input prices on the market, but does not know which input is appropriate. 5 General divisions of surplus between the two managers could be considered without a¤ecting the main results. 6 This assumption is stronger than necessary. What is important for the analysis is that repayments to investors cannot be made fully contingent on the realization of pro…ts. Assuming a linear stealing technology avoids a bias in favour of (respectively, against) vertical integration purely originating from increasing (respectively, decreasing) returns in such technology. 7 We assume that control over …nancial streams cannot be (fully) separated from ownership because (part of) the returns cannot be veri…ed. Ownership entails the right to sign contracts with third parties that could be used to generate private bene…ts for the owner. The assumption that employees cannot steal is made to focus our attention on the agency con ‡ict between the …rm(s) and the investor. avoid repayments to employees and suppliers. Section 4.1 relaxes the assumption and considers a more general case in which the owner can avoid payments to employees and input suppliers as well.
In the remainder of the text, the downstream manager will also be called buyer under nonintegration and owner under vertical integration. Similarly, the upstream manager will also be called seller under non-integration and worker (or employee) under vertical integration.
Initial Contract and Timing of Events
Neither manager has cash, and both needs to borrow in order to …nance the start up costs of the two projects. These costs are denoted by k d and k u for the downstream and upstream units, respectively. If either of the two managers fails to get capital to …nance her project, she can start a smaller project that requires no initial capital disbursement (she could, for instance, become self-employed in the informal sector). We normalize the payo¤ of starting such a business with no capital to be equal to zero. Since we are interested in determining i) which organizational form raises more external funds, and ii) which projects can be …nanced by external investors, the analysis assumes that there is a unique risk-neutral investor who has all the ex-ante bargaining power. Contracts are thus signed to maximize the pledgeable income of the two projects, subject to the participation constraints of the two managers. 8 Only simple debt-like contracts are feasible. The investor holds a debt-like claim B over the pro…ts of a …rm. When the …rm is integrated there is a unique B: When the two …rms are not integrated, the investor holds claims B d and B u on the pro…ts of the downstream and upstream …rms, respectively. The monitoring costs associated with equity-like contracts are assumed to be prohibitively high.
To summarize, the timing of events is as follows (see Figure 1 ). At date 0 contracts are signed.
First, either an integrated …rm or two non-integrated …rms are created (allocation of control rights).
Then, the …nancial contract(s) between the owner(s) of the …rm(s) and the investor are signed. At date 1/2, the state of nature is realized and observed by the managers. Given the ownership con…guration, the two managers bargain at date 1 over the input transaction. At date 2 pro…ts are We focus for simplicity on the case ' 1; and relegate to Section 6 a short discussion of the more general case. In order to avoid a taxonomy of cases, we focus on the case in which, under non-integration, the participation constraint of the upstream manager is not binding, i.e.,
3 The Costs and Bene…ts of Vertical Integration
Derivation of Pledgeable Incomes
Pledgeable Income under Vertical Integration
Under vertical integration the investor chooses the debt level B in order to maximize the pledgeable income of the integrated …rm. With probability the market price for an appropriate input is p = p > c: The employee should produce the input at cost c; and the two divisions of the integrated …rm should trade together. The owner of the …rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er w to her employee. Since the downstream manager is the owner of the …rm, the employee does not have the right to sell the input on the market at price p; and therefore her outside option in the bargaining game is equal to zero. The owner then o¤ers a wage w = (1 )c that exactly compensates the employee for the costs associated with e¤ort, and the o¤er is accepted. The owner of the …rm also purchases the necessary tools and input required by the employee to produce the input at cost c:
The monetary pro…ts (gross of debt repayments) of the …rm are given by (p) = V c: As owner of the …rm, the downstream manager repays debt B if this is more pro…table than hiding the monetary pro…ts, keeping a fraction 1 ' of them. This happens if (p) B (1 ') (p);
i.e., if B '(V c):
Similarly, with probability 1 the market price for an appropriate input is p = p < c. The input is procured on the spot market at price p. The monetary pro…ts (gross of debt repayments)
of the …rm are given by (p) = V p; so that the owner of the …rm repays debt B if and only if
The investor trades o¤ a higher debt level B with a higher probability that the debt is repaid.
The investor can set B = '(V c) and be repaid regardless of the state of the world, or set
and be repaid only with probability 1 : When V is higher, the …rst option becomes relatively more pro…table. The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 1
The pledgeable income of an integrated …rm, denoted P int ; is given by
The pledgeable income of an integrated …rm is i) increasing in the degree of investors'protection ', ii) decreasing in the (expected) cost of the input (c; and p), iii) increasing and convex in downstream cash ‡ows V; and iv) independent of the composition of input costs :
Pledgeable Income under Non-Integration
Under non-integration the two units are two independent …rms managed by two separate owners.
The investor chooses debt levels B d and B u in order to maximize the joint pledgeable income of the two non-integrated …rms.
With probability 1 the market price for an appropriate input is p = p < c. As for the case of integration, the investor trades o¤ a higher debt level B i in each …rm i 2 fd; ug with a higher probability that the debt will be repaid. For the upstream …rm, the optimal debt level is obviously given by
This debt is repaid with probability ; and the pledgeable income of the upstream …rm is given by
The pledgeable income of the downstream …rm is given by
The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 2 The total pledgeable income of two non-integrated …rms, denoted P ni ; is given by
The total pledgeable income of two independent …rms P ni is i) increasing in the degree of investors'protection ', ii) increasing and convex in downstream cash ‡ows V; and, iii) decreasing in the share of monetary costs borne by the owner . In contrast to the pledgeable income under integration P int , P ni depends on p and : P ni depends on p because when the two …rms trade together the price p = p prevailing in the input market pins down, through bargaining, the division of surplus between the two …rms. It also depends on because of a fundamental accounting di¤erence between vertical integration and non-integration. While the value added and the pro…ts are equal along the chain under the two organizational forms, the monetary pro…ts are not. This is because under integration the non-monetary costs (1 )c are transformed into a monetary disbursement corresponding to a wage, while under non-integration they are not.
Under non-integration the division of surplus between the two …rms does not depend on the debt levels B d and B u : In fact, the pledgeable income P ni is simply given by the sum of the pledgeable incomes of the two …rms, i.e., P ni = P d + P u : 10 9 Note that the seller's monetary payo¤ is given by (p c) Bu which is strictly larger than her e¤ort cost
; the participation constraint of the upstream manager is binding and Bu = p c.
1 0 Moreover, since the buyer has all the ex-post bargaining power and ' 1, P d is independent of whether …rm u
Comparison of the two structures
The next proposition compares the pledgeable income under the two organizational forms and provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which vertical integration delivers a higher pledgeable income than non-integration. Depending on parameters, the pledgeable income might be higher either under vertical integration or under non-integration, as illustrated in Figure ? ?. Figure ? ? plots the pledgeable incomes under vertical integration and non-integration as a function of product market cash ‡ows V:
When V is su¢ ciently low, it is optimal to set a high debt level which is repaid only when input market conditions are favorable to the downstream …rm, i.e., when p = p. This implies that the debt capacity of an integrated …rm is equal to the debt capacity of the downstream …rm under non-integration, i.e.,
Under non-integration, however, the investor can also seek repayment from the upstream owner, P u = ' (p c): Non-integration then dominates since under vertical integration the investor cannot seek repayments from an employee, whilst under non-integration she can seek repayments from the upstream …rm owner, thus laying claims on the earnings of this agent as well. I label this negative e¤ect of vertical integration "demonitoring" e¤ect. 11 At higher levels of V; however, it becomes optimal to set a level of debt which is repaid regardless of input market conditions. Relative to the pro…ts in a non-integrated chain, the pro…ts of the vertically integrated …rm are relatively more insulated from input market conditions, and has been …nanced or not (and vice versa). All …nancial externalities have been removed and the optimal …nancial contract can be obtained independently for each …rm. The more general case is brie ‡y discussed in Section 6. V ; where value added is de…ned as the 1 2 Proposition 3 also implies that vertical integration is preferred for higher (i.e., @V @ < 0). This result resonates with the view that independent ownership is better when human capital investments are important, while coordination of capital investment is better achieved through centralized ownership (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1991)). 1 3 Obviously, this result is only valid in Case 2 of Proposition 3. 1 4 The linear stealing technology implies that the conditions in Proposition 3 do not depend on the degree of investor protection ': Decreasing (respectively increasing) returns to scale in the stealing technology favor vertical integration (respectively non-integration).
di¤erence between revenues and material input costs. The idea beyond the index is that, ceteris paribus, a vertically integrated …rm has higher value added, since more stages of the production process are performed in-house. The de…nition of vertical integration in the model parallels the index.
Remark
Under constant value added along the chain across organizational forms (i.e. V A int = V A ni ),
Extensions
The preceding considerations give some con…dence that the trade-o¤ captured by the baseline model has practical relevance. This section considers two extensions to the baseline model and derives testable predictions linking the degree of investor's protection and vertical integration. 
Contractual Imperfections with Suppliers
In practice, the buyer and the seller rarely exchange cash for the input at the same time. Trade credit is extended by suppliers to buyers whenever inputs are paid for at a later date (see, e.g., Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) for an insightful model of trade credit). Conversely, putting-out systems emerge when buyers collect …nished inputs after having supplied upstream producers with cash or material advances (see, e.g., Kranton and Swamy (2006) for a model of putting-out systems inspired by textile manufacturing during the colonial period in India).
Under both systems (trade credit and putting-out), the contractual relationship between the downstream manager and the upstream manager could be plagued by similar agency problems as the one described in the model between the investor and the entrepreneurs. For instance, in the case of putting-out systems, the seller could use the cash or material advanced by the buyer to produce an input that would then be sold on the market. Under trade credit, the buyer could simply hide cash ‡ows, avoiding repayment to investors as well as to suppliers (and/or employees).
This section discusses a simple extension of the model that allows the buyer to steal revenues avoiding repayment to the investor as well as to the supplier (or employee). In particular, we are interested in distinguishing between the degree of "investor protection" ' (i.e., the extent to which entrepreneurs can steal pro…ts from external investors) and "contract enforcement" , i.e., the extent to which buyers can avoid paying suppliers for the input provided.
The model is as in the previous section, the only di¤erence being that entrepreneurs can, at some cost, avoid repaying input suppliers as well as external investors. After receiving the input at an agreed price P and producing …nal cash ‡ows V; assume that the owner can hide revenues and keep (1 ')(V P ) for herself, with 1 parametrizing the degree through which it is possible to avoid repaying input suppliers. If ! 1; an entrepreneur can only hide pro…ts, as in the previous section. Conversely, if ! 0; the entrepreneur can steal revenues, and completely avoid repaying suppliers.
The parameter is related to the possibility of assuring repayment for the input and does not depend on the nature of the input transacted (e.g., labour or tools). The parameter captures in a simple way the level of di¢ culties in avoiding repayment to suppliers of intermediate inputs,
regardless of whether they are employees of the …rm or arm's length suppliers on the market. While can be linked to the technology of production (for instance, if the input can easily be split into small components that are used at di¤erent dates, then ! 1), our preferred interpretation links to features of the institutional environment in which the …rms operate.
A …rst interpretation links to the degree of contractual enforcement. In countries with relatively more e¢ cient courts, it might be harder to avoid payments and circumvent the contractual obligation of paying suppliers. A second interpretation is that proxies for the quality of informal monitoring mechanism available to suppliers. For example, within communities, should be expected to be higher. Avoiding repayment to suppliers and hiding pro…ts might be at the same time more di¢ cult and more costly (in terms of loss of reputation) within a closed community.
The only di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that the incentive compatibility con-straint to induce debt repayment has to take into account the agency problem between the owner and her employee/supplier. In particular, given a generic debt level B and an input price p; the owner repays the investor and her employee/supplier if V p B (1 ')(V p); i.e. if
B 'V p;
where = (1 (1 ')) ': The key di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that the pledgeable income is now reduced by an amount = (1 ')(1 )p; which is increasing in the input price p:
The model can be solved following the same steps as in Section 3.2. When this is done, the pledgeable income of an integrated …rm is given by
Similarly, the pledgeable incomes of the downstream and upstream …rms are respectively given by P d = maxf('V p); (1 )('V p)g and P u = ('p c): As before, the pledgeable income of a non-integrated structure is given by the sum of the pledgeable incomes of the two independent …rms, i.e.,
Under both structures the pledgeable income is increasing in since, through the incentive compatibility constraint, the debt level has to take into account the incentive costs associated with repaying the employee/supplier as well. 
0.
While the essence of the trade-o¤s described in Section 3.2 is preserved, there are a number of important di¤erences, since the comparison between the pledgeable incomes of the two structures depends on the degree of investor protection ' and on contractual enforcement :
Imperfections in the enforcement of contracts between the seller and the buyer have an ambiguous e¤ect on vertical integration. On the one hand, since input transactions among independent …rms occur at higher prices, p > c, the rents necessary to give repayment incentives are higher under non-integration than under vertical integration. This e¤ect captures the common argument that vertical integration is preferred in the presence of contractual imperfections. On the other hand, by increasing the rents necessary to assure debt repayment, contractual imperfections reduce pledgeable incomes and, as discussed in Section 3.2, favor non-integration.
When pledgeable incomes are low, e.g., because of low '; an increase in contractual enforcement might raise the pledgeable income to the point at which the joint liability e¤ect kicks-in and vertical integration becomes the preferred organizational form. At higher levels of pledgeable incomes, however, a further increase in erodes the bene…ts of the joint liability, since
This e¤ect might lead to non-integration being the preferred organizational form. The relationship between vertical integration and contractual enforcement might then be non-monotonic, as in case 2 in Proposition 4.
How does the institutional environment shape the costs and bene…ts of vertical integration in terms of pledgeable income? Proposition 4 shows that the degree of investor protection ' and the degree of contractual imperfections in input markets interact in a complex way. Figure ? ? shows on the horizontal axis the quality of contract enforcement between buyers and sellers; and on the vertical axis the degree ' of investor protection and illustrates case 2 in the Proposition: 15 Figure ? ? has two main implications. First, …xing '; Figure ? ? shows that higher contract enforcement in input markets leads to lower vertical integration only if …nancial markets are su¢ -ciently developed (high '). Otherwise, the increase in pledgeable income implied by higher makes vertical integration relatively more pro…table.
Second, since the parts of ' and that are determined by formal institutions (i.e., legal system, courts, etc.) are positively correlated across countries (countries with courts enforcing contracts also protect the interests of external investors), the appropriate comparative statics should be performed along the diagonal, from bottom-left to top-right. Figure ? ?, then, casts doubts on the view that vertical integration should be more prevalent in countries that do not have well-functioning courts which enforce contracts. Vertical integration dominates non-integration in terms of pledgeable income only at the intermediate level of institutional development.
Industry Equilibrium
This section introduces product market competition at the end of the value chain. To simplify exposition, we mantain the assumption that investors have all the ex-ante bargaining power. This is consistent with competition in the product market if, for example, there are many potential investors and each pair of entrepreneurs d and u can only raise funds from one investor (e.g., because of monitoring reasons). 16 In order to study the industry equilibrium, we …rst need to characterize the optimal …nancing decision from the point of view of each investor, taking as given cash ‡ows at the end of the chain, V . The existence of credit constraints implies that both units will not always be …nanced despite being pro…table. 17 In particular, each investor can choose one project ! in the set of available opportunities, denoted by ! 2 fd; u; ni; intg: She can choose one "large" project, ! = int; in which case she …nances the entire value chain under the umbrella of a single vertically integrated …rm. Otherwise, she can …nance two small projects organizing the value chain with two independent …rms, i.e., ! = ni. Finally, she can choose one of the two small projects, i.e., …nancing only one of the two units (either u or d), if this option delivers higher expected returns. The subscripts d and u will denote those two projects. 18 The downstream and upstream units …xed costs are k d and k u respectively; while = k u + k d are the …xed costs to …nance the entire value chain, regardless of organizational form, i.e., k int = k ni = . The (net) present value P V ! of a project ! 2 is given by the di¤erence between the expected returns from the project and the corresponding …xed costs. The expected returns are simply given by the pledgeable incomes derived in the previous section. Therefore, P V ! = P ! k ! : 1 6 For the sake of expositional simplicity, the analysis focuses on the baseline model in Section 2 and sets = 1. 1 7 There are credit constraints in the sense that there exist pro…table investment opportunities that cannot be …nanced because of low investor protection. This follows from maxfPint; Pnig < V C; where C = c + (1 )p is the level of expected costs. 1 8 Since, as noted in Section 3.1, the pledgeable income of two non-integrated …rms Pni is given by the sum of the pledgeable incomes of the two units, i.e., Pni = Pu + P d ; the option ni available to the investor is simply the sum of the two projects d and u:
The investor chooses the option ! 2 that delivers the highest returns.
Since the pledgeable income under non-integration is equal to the sum of the pledgeable incomes of the two independent …rms, P ni = P u + P d ; the condition P ni > P int implies that, if both units u and d deliver positive returns, i.e., P d > k d and P u > k u ; the investor …nances a non-integrated value chain and vertical integration never arises. If either of the two projects has a negative return, the investor does not …nance it. If, however, P int > P ni ; vertical integration emerges in equilibrium only if it delivers higher returns than any combination of the two smaller projects d and u: P int > P ni is necessary but not su¢ cient for vertical integration to emerge. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for vertical integration to be chosen by the investor is that
For su¢ ciently high levels of investor protection '; vertical integration is always chosen if P int > P ni , while for extremely low values of '; no …rm can be …nanced at all. At intermediate levels of investor protection, however, two alternative scenarios might arise, depending on whether a small …rm can be …nanced or not. 19 The following Lemma summarizes the preciding discussion and characterizes the investment decision as a function of investor protection '.
Lemma 1 a) If P int < P ni ; vertical integration is never chosen. Moreover; there exist unique The …nancial constraints implied by low investor protection, therefore, can take di¤erent forms depending on the type of industry. In industries in which P ni > P int , …nancial constraints a¤ect the creation of …rms. In industries in which P int > P ni ; instead, …nancial constraints a¤ect the size of …rms. Second, if investors/entrepreneurs are heterogenous with respect to ' or initial wealth;
within industries those with a higher ' are more likely to …nance/run a vertically integrated …rm. 20 
Product Market Competition and Industry Equilibrium
Having determined the optimal investment from the point of view of each investor taking as given cash ‡ows generated at the product market, we endogenize the number (mass) of value chains …nanced in the industry. Let us assume that the industry faces an aggregate demand schedule P (Q)
for the …nal good; where P is the price at which Q units of the good can be sold on the market, and P 0 (Q) < 0: Let P (Q) < P for all Q:
Since each …rm produces only 1 unit of the …nal good, the supply in the industry is given by the number (mass) N of …rms that are …nanced in equilibrium, i.e., Q = N and V = P (Q): Free entry requires that, in equilibrium, it is not possible to …nance any additional …rm without implying losses for the investor. This, in turn, implies that the pledgeable income of the marginal entrant must be exactly equal to the investments required to start a …rm. 21 Therefore, in an equilibrium in which the entire value chain is …nanced under organizational form i 2 fni; intg; it must be that
Conditional on both units being …nanced, the free-entry condition (6) captures the common intuition that better investor protection leads to higher entry and lower equilibrium pro…ts. Higher investor protection ' always increases N; the mass of …rms entering the industry. In equilibrium, free entry implies that all investors earn zero pro…ts. Since, under both organizational form i 2 fint; nig; the pledgeable income (and therefore investor's returns) are increasing in investor protection '; the pro…ts of each value chain must decrease when investor protection improves. This happens through an increase in entry, N; which, increasing competition in the …nal product market, lowers revenues V (since V = P (N ) and P 0 (N ) < 0).
So far, we have focussed on the case in which the entire value chain is …nanced. The following proposition combines the insights of Proposition 3 (P ni > P int if V is low), Lemma 1 and the free entry condition (6) to fully characterizes the industry equilibrium. When ' is su¢ ciently high, however, better …nancial markets allow more …rms to enter the industry implying that the value chain eventually disintegrates into two non-integrated …rms. 23 2 2 One of the two intervals I [' ; ' + ] and I [' 0 ; ' ] might be empty. They cannot both be empty. 2 3 A further prediction is that higher capital intensity, i.e., greater = ku + k d ; favours vertical integration. For a given level of ', higher equilibrium revenues V = P (N ) are required to sustain higher capital investment . As seen above, when revenues are higher vertical integration delivers higher pledgeable income than non-integration, and therefore becomes the equilibrium organizational form.
Evidence
This section discusses evidence on the relationship between vertical integration and …nancial markets development. Section 4 combined the key insight from Proposition 3 with well known mechanisms associated with imperfect contracting and borrowing constraints. Before discussing the evidence, it is worth summarizing the main testable predictions of the model:
Summary of Testable Predictions:
i ) better contract enforcement with input suppliers (resp., investor protection) reduces vertical integration if investor protection (resp., contract enforcement) is su¢ ciently high;
ii ) better investor protection has an inverted-U relationship with vertical integration. 24 The part of the …rst prediction on the relationship between vertical integration and better contract enforcement with input suppliers is consistent with anecdotal evidence on subcontracting within networks of small …rms in community-based industrial districts (see, e.g., Humphry (1995) ). Brusco (1982) , for the case of Italy, describes the organization of production in the industrial districts in Emilia-Romagna, a region well known for its high levels of social capital (high ).
The organization of production is characterized by extensive subcontracting and very low levels of vertical integration. In contrast, Banerjee (2004) For instance, the Stitched Garment industry in Calcutta is organized in relatively small but fully vertically integrated …rms that almost exclusively employ workers of the same community as that of the owner of the …rm (often migrating from remote rural areas). Similarly, in the Knitted Garment industry in Tirupur, the …rms belonging to the local dominant community, and which presumably have access to higher than …rms owned by outsiders, are more vertically integrated than …rms owned by outsiders, which tend to be relatively disintegrated. If …rms in Italy have better access to capital (higher ') than …rms in India, these facts are consistent with our model. In the case of Italy, then, the model shows that tight community ties allow for a decentralized organization of production. In the case of India, however, the tight community ties lead to production being carried within vertically integrated …rms. 2 4 This second prediction is implied by both extensions, although through a di¤erent economic mechanisms.
More generally, the …rst prediction is consistent with empirical evidence on di¤erences in the degree of vertical integration across countries. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) The relationship between …nancial development and industry concentration is not speci…c to the nineteenth-century textile industry. In a recent paper, Mitton (2008) uses a new dataset of 1.3 million …rms from over 100 countries and shows that concentration is higher in countries with lower investor protection and other regulatory barriers that restrict entry and competition. 26 Having established that low …nancial development leads to higher concentration and increases 2 5 The cotton textile industry is an ideal setting to analyze the e¤ects of …nancial development on market concentration since, according to Haber (1991) , in the early textile cotton industry "the usual mechanisms by which …rms obtain market control were lacking" and "no signi…cant barriers to entry existed" in the industry (other than credit constraints). 2 6 Similarly, Beck et al. (2005) …nd, in a di¤erent …rm-level survey database covering 54 countries, that …nancial underdevelopment constrains the growth of smaller …rms.
rents by sheltering …rms from competition, we need to show that …rms in less competitive environments are more vertically integrated. There is evidence supporting this prediction too, although the evidence relies on rents generated by trade protection rather than low …nancial development.
Trade policies have been an important determinant of the degree of competition to which …rms in the nineteenth-century textile industry were exposed. For instance, Temin (1988) notes that powerful interest groups in New England ensured very e¤ective trade protection to the textile industry.
Similarly, Brown (1992) reports that the German textile industry also enjoyed a very high level of protection in the late nineteenth century. In both Germany and New England …rms were substantially larger and more vertically integrated than in England, where …rms were instead exposed to a more competitive trade regime.
Similar evidence can be found in the automobile industry in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Helper and Hochfelder (1996) report that credit was a substantial problem in the organization and expansion in the early years of the industry (when V was, presumably, still low). While the degree of vertical integration varied from …rm to …rm, virtually all automobile companies began as assemblers rather than as manufacturers, implying low degrees of vertical integration. While the industry witnessed a trend towards vertical integration in the 1920s, during the boom of the car market (higher V ), Langlois and Robertson (1989) show that the Depression reverted the trend, with the share of intermediate inputs purchased from external suppliers going up. In the absence of signi…cant technological innovations, the reduction in market size (lower V ) and the more di¢ cult access to credit (lower ') were the major determinants of the organizational shift away from vertical integration. 27 6 Discussion
E¢ ciency
In order to focus on the e¤ects of vertical integration on the capacity to raise external …nance, we have made two key assumptions: i) production e¢ ciency is the same under the two organizational forms, and ii) the investor has all the bargaining power. We now discuss those two assumptions in greater detail.
The assumption that production e¢ ciency is the same under both organizational forms implies that the only e¢ ciency implications that can be derived from the model concern whether …rms get started or not. 28 The model does not deliver predictions about whether there is "too much"or "too little" vertical integration. It is possible to consider a case in which one of the two organizational forms is more e¢ cient than the other without a¤ecting the trade-o¤ described in the model. In general, if the organizational choice is chosen to maximize pledgeable income, there is no guarantee that it will be the e¢ cient one.
Competitive Credit Markets
The second assumption is that the investor has all the bargaining power, and the organizational form is chosen to maximize her returns. What happens, instead, if the credit market is competitive?
Keeping the assumption that it is pro…table to …nance the entire value chain, we start by noting that, at the ex-ante contracting stage, the two managers bargain over the organizational form to be chosen. The outside options of the downstream and upstream managers in the ex-ante bargaining depend on whether their …rms can be …nanced or not.
The main insights of the model are robust to the case in which the credit market is competitive. This is because two cash constrained managers tend to chose the organizational form that maximizes the amount of money they are able to raise from external investors and transfer the borrowed money according to the ex-ante distribution of bargaining power, enabling them to reduce ine¢ ciencies in bargaining. As in the baseline model, P int > P ni is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for vertical integration to arise. 29 Similarly, vertical integration is never …nanced if it has a lower pledgeable income than non-integration, i.e., P int < P ni : Note, however, that the condition P ni > k d + k u is necessary but not su¢ cient for the entire value chain to be …nanced. If one of the …rms cannot be …nanced independently, i.e., either P d < k d or P u < k u , the owner of the …rm that can be …nanced will not agree to a contract that …nances the other …rm as well, and ine¢ ciencies arise.
Wealth can also be added to the model. A wealthier entrepreneur is more likely to be able to …nance her own …rm, and will therefore have a better outside option. Whether this leads to more or less vertical integration, however, depends on which manager has the wealth. 30 
Contractual Externalities
By focussing on the case in which ' 1; the model has removed ex-ante contractual externalities:
When < 1; the two projects become linked by a common destiny and potential externalities arise.
To see why this is the case, note that, when the upstream project has not been …nanced, the net present value of the downstream project is given by
Similarly, when the downstream …rm is not …nanced, the net present value of the upstream …rm is given by
The net present value of the entire chain is given by
In other words, when < 1, the whole chain is worth more than the sum of its parts. Decentralized investors typically will not replicate the contracts signed by a sole investor, as the investor …nancing the upstream unit might not take into account the positive e¤ect on the net present value of the downstream unit, and vice versa. It can be shown that these externalities might lead to underinvestment or to more vertical integration in the presence of inequality in borrowing capacity among entrepreneurs.
Further Remarks
The model abstracts from other factors that are likely to a¤ect the integration decision of small and medium-sized …rms in developing countries. An often quoted constraint on …rms in developing countries is uncertainty in input supply (see e.g. Mookerjee (1999)). Since less developed countries are likely to be characterized by more uncertain and volatile input markets, vertical integration could be relatively more prevalent in those countries. If better …nancial markets increase entry (and reduce uncertainty) in input markets, a further negative e¤ect of …nancial development on vertical integration should be observed in the data. 31 Since the main bene…ts of vertical integration come from joint liability, a previous version of the paper studied joint liability contracts among independent …rms. 32 Restricting attention to collusion-proof contracts, in which the investor cannot hold claims on the pro…ts of the …rm which depend on the identity of the contractual parties involved in the input transaction, the model shows that joint liability does not change the condition under which vertical integration delivers higher pledgeable income. In other words, the bene…ts of joint liability are better achieved under vertical integration: joint liability and centralized allocation of control rights are complementary tools in the hands of the external investor to maximize pledgeable income. 33 
Conclusions
This paper explores the connections between investor protection and vertical integration. It has derived the costs and bene…ts of vertical integration from the point of view of an external investor:
vertical integration trades o¤ the bene…ts of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to standard arguments that link higher degrees of vertical integration to more pervasive input and capital market imperfections, the tradeo¤ implies that the relationship between vertical integration and the quality of the institutional environment is a complex one, and that more vertical integration should not be expected in devel-oping countries. In particular, the model predicts that vertical integration is more likely to arise for intermediate levels of investor protection and that better contract enforcement reduces vertical integration only if …nancial markets are su¢ ciently developed. We have discussed various sources of evidence which is in line with both predictions.
This paper has taken the view that the institutional environment, as opposed to technological considerations, is a major determinant of organizational forms. Future theoretical work should explore the interaction between …nancial and other institutional constraints on industrial structure, supply chain performance, technology adoption, and organizational forms. Eventually, this line of research will not only improve our understanding of …rms and markets but will also lead to better design of policies aimed at fostering industrial upgrading and development.
.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
Note …rst that P ni and P int are strictly increasing, convex and piecewise linear in V; and that their slopes with respect to V are either equal to ' or to '(1 ): This implies that the two curves will cross once at most. When V is su¢ ciently large, we have P int > P ni if and only if (p c) (p c) (denote this as condition N ). When, however, V is su¢ ciently low, we have P int < P ni : The two curves cross exactly once if (p c) (p c) and never cross otherwise. If 
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof of the Proposition mimics the proof of Proposition 3. Note …rst that P ni and P int are strictly increasing, convex and piecewise linear in V; and that their slopes with respect to V are either equal to ' or to '(1 ): This implies that the two curves will cross once at most. When V is su¢ ciently large, we have P int > P ni if and only if (p c) > ( ' p c): When, however, V is su¢ ciently low, we have P int < P ni : The two curves cross exactly once if (p c) > ( ' p c) and never cross otherwise. If the two curves cross, they do so when P int = 'V c and P ni = 
0:
If, instead, (p c) < p c; then ('; ) < c(1 ) for high enough. This implies that P int > P ni only for values of V e de…ned by (V e ; '; ) = ('; ) such that (V e ; '; ) c(1 ):
Solving the two equations in succession, we obtain that the minimum V is given by V = p p (1 )p p (1 )c : Moreover, since ('; 1) < c(1 ); the condition can only be satis…ed for < (') < 1: At the same time, we need (V; '; ) > c(1 ); i.e. 0 (') < : Again, applying the implicit function theorem gives the comparative statics result and concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider …rst the case P int P ni : Since P int and P ni are both strictly increasing functions of '; there exists a unique ' such that P int (' ) k = 0 and integration is not chosen if ' < ' :
Obviously P ni (' ) k 0; and therefore the two …rms are never …nanced in a non-integrated way.
De…ne ' d and ' u as the thresholds of ' at which P d (' d ) k d = 0 and P u (' u ) k u = 0 respectively.
Since P ni = P d + P u P int it follows that maxf' d ; ' u g ' ; with equality holding if and only if P ni = P int and ' d = ' u : De…ning ' = minf' d ; ' u g; and noting that ' 7 ' depending on parameters, concludes the proof of the …rst part of the proposition.
The proof of the second part of the proposition is very similar. Obviously, there exists a unique ' 0 = maxf' d ; ' u g such that if ' ' 0 two …rms are …nanced, and non-integration is chosen.
Similarly, de…ning ' 00 = minf' d ; ' u ; ' g; if ' ' 00 no …rm is …nanced. For ' 2 (' 0 ; ' 00 ) one …rm is …nanced (either the downstream …rm, the upstream …rm or a vertically integrated …rm). However, since P ni = P d + P u > P int simple algebra shows that minf' d ; ' u ; ' g 6 = ' ; and therefore vertical integration never arises in equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
